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This note tries to clarify some remaining issues in the debate on the effect of income shocks on 
civil conflict. Section 1 discusses the discrepant findings on the effect of rainfall shocks on 
civil conflict in Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011) and Ciccone (2011). Section 2 develops an 
instrumental variables approach to estimate the effect of transitory (rainfall-driven) income 
shocks on civil conflict and contrasts the conclusions with those of Miguel, Satyanath, and 
Sergenti (2004) and Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011). Throughout, the note uses the data of 
Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti to focus on the methodological issues at the core of the debate 
(for results using the latest data see Ciccone, 2011). 
1. Rainfall and Civil Conflict 
Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004), MSS from now on, argue that low rainfall levels and 
negative rainfall shocks caused civil conflict in Sub-Saharan African countries 1979-1999. 
Their conclusion is based on the following regression of conflict indicators on year-on-year 
rainfall growth rates, 
(1)    , 0 , 1 , 1 , c t c c c t c t c t Conflict t b RGr b RGr u a g - = + + + + ,   2 
where  , c t Conflict  is an indicator variable for conflict in country  c at time t;  c ct a g +  is a 
country fixed effect plus a country-specific linear time trend; and  , c t u  a regression residual. 
t RGr  is the rainfall growth rate between year t and t-1, which MSS use to proxy rainfall 
shocks. The civil conflict indicators used are civil conflict onset which captures the outbreak 
of civil conflict, and civil conflict incidence which pools new and continuing civil conflicts. 
MSS’s least-squares estimates of equation (1) yield an insignificant effect of rainfall growth at 
t but a statistically significant, negative effect of rainfall growth at t-1. MSS interpret this as 
evidence that lower rainfall levels and negative rainfall shocks raise conflict risk. 
  Year-on-year rainfall growth can be approximated by the log difference in rainfall levels 
between adjacent years,  , , , 1 log log c t c t c t RGr R R - = - . Hence, equation (1) can be rewritten as 
(2)    0 1 , 1 2 , 2 , log log log t c c t c t c t c t Conflict t R R R u a g b b b - - = + + + + + . 
Ciccone (2011) observes that if MSS’s interpretation of the significantly negative effect on 
lagged rainfall growth in equation (1) is correct and lower rainfall levels raise conflict risk, 
then there should be some significant negative  b  when estimating (2) with MSS’s data. But 
the least-squares estimates of equation (2) in Table 1 (conflict onset) and Table 2 (conflict 
incidence) at the end of this note show that rainfall levels are statistically insignificant except 
for  t-2  rainfall  levels  which  enter  positively.  Hence,  somewhat  counterintuitively,  lower 
rainfall levels are associated with significantly less civil conflict onset and incidence (with a 
lag) in MSS’s data. 
  The  stochastic  process  of  log  rainfall  levels  can  be  modeled  as 
, , 1 , log log c t c c t c t R r R r e - = + +   where  r   captures  the  persistence  of  rainfall  and  t e   rainfall 
shocks. In MSS’s data, rainfall levels are strongly mean reverting:  r  is 0.17 when country 
fixed effects are accounted for and 0.04 when both country fixed effects and linear country   3 
trends are taken into account (further rainfall lags are statistically insignificant). Hence, most 
of  the  variation  in  rainfall  levels  over  time  corresponds  to  rainfall  shocks.  Strong  mean 
reversion of rainfall levels also implies that year-on-year rainfall growth rates are predictable: 
rainfall growth tends to be high following negative rainfall shocks and low following positive 
rainfall shocks. Ciccone therefore argues that it is unclear whether MSS’s finding of a negative 
effect of lagged year-on-year rainfall growth on conflict risk should be interpreted as conflict 
being more likely following negative rainfall shocks. In fact, the estimates of equation (2) in 
Tables 1 and 2 suggest the contrary: civil conflict is more likely following positive rainfall 
shocks. 
  Just like Ciccone, Miguel and Satyanath (2011) find that there is no statistically significant 
effect of t and t-1 rainfall levels on civil conflict, see their results in Table 1, Panel C, column 
(2)  which  I  am  reproducing  in  Table  3,  column  (2)  for  convenience.  But  in  contrast  to 
Ciccone, they also find t-2 rainfall levels to be a statistically insignificant determinant of civil 
conflict.  What  explains  the  discrepancy  between  Miguel  and  Satyanath’s  and  Ciccone’s 
findings? First, Miguel and Satyanath do not consider civil conflict onset, which is the variable 
in MSS that  captures the outbreak of civil conflicts. Second, when  Miguel and  Satyanath 
examine the effect of rainfall on civil conflict incidence, they do not control for lagged conflict 
incidence. This imposes that civil conflict is equally likely whether or not there was a civil 
conflict in the previous year. Ciccone controls for lagged conflict incidence and finds that the 
likelihood of civil conflict is significantly greater if there was a conflict in the previous year. 
Once the persistence of civil conflict is taken into account, lower t-2 rainfall levels and rainfall 
shocks are associated with significantly less civil conflict incidence. 
  Miguel and Satyanath (2011) argue that the results of the rainfall growth specification 
show  that  civil  conflict  risk  is  significantly  higher  following  falling  year-on-year  rainfall   4 
levels. They see this result as consistent with behavioral economic theories where individuals 
are sensitive to recent rainfall changes relative to a status quo (defined as last year’s rainfall 
level).  However,  the  rainfall  level  results  in  Table  1  and  2  show  that  conflict  risk  is  not 
significantly higher when rainfall levels fall year-on-year because an average rainfall year is 
followed by a negative rainfall shock. Civil conflict risk in MSS’s data is only significantly 
higher when rainfall levels fall year-on-year because a positive rainfall shock is followed by an 
average rainfall year.  
  Miguel and Satyanath (2011) also argue that the (unrestricted) rainfall level specification 
lends some support to MSS’s (restricted) rainfall growth specification. To see their argument, 
note that a rainfall growth specification where only the lagged rainfall growth rate matters for 
conflict  implies  that  the  coefficient  on  t-2  rainfall  levels  is  equal  to  the  negative  of  the 
coefficient on t-1 rainfall levels. As Miguel and Satyanath’s rainfall level results reproduced in 
Table  3  do  not  reject  this  hypothesis,  they  see  some  support  for  this  rainfall  growth 
specification. However, two further implications of this rainfall growth specification for the 
rainfall level specification would be that rainfall levels at t-1 are significantly negative and that 
rainfall levels at t-2 are significantly positive. Both implications are rejected by Miguel and 
Satyanath’s results reproduced in Table 3 (my results reported in Table 1 and 2 only reject the 
first of the two implications). 
  Another interesting issue in the debate is the following. Ignore for a moment that the t-2 
rainfall level in Miguel and Satyanath’s (2011) specification reproduced in Table 3 only enters 
insignificantly  because  the  persistence  of  civil  conflict is not  accounted  for.  How can  the 
insignificant  effect  of  rainfall  levels  in  column  (2)  be  reconciled  with  the  statistically 
significant, negative effect of t-1 rainfall growth in column (1)? To understand this, it is useful 
to return to the stochastic process for log rainfall levels  , , 1 , log log c t c c t c t R r R r e - = + +  and take   5 
0 r =  for simplicity (we have already seen that  r  is small in MSS’s data). In this case, the 
year-on-year rainfall growth rate can be approximated by   , , 1 , , 1 log log c t c t c t c t R R e e - - - = -  and 
the rainfall growth rate may therefore be low because (i) there is a negative rainfall shock at t, 
, 0 c t e < ; (ii) there is a positive rainfall shock at t-1,  , 1 0 c t e - > ; (iii) a positive rainfall shock at t-
1 is followed by a negative rainfall shock at t. The rainfall growth specification in Table 3, 
column (1) does not allow to distinguish between these cases. The rainfall level specification 
does and the results in Table 3, column (2) indicate that rainfall shocks in any one year do not 
appear  to  be  causing  civil  conflict.  But  what  about  the  hypothesis  that  conflict  risk  is 
significantly higher when a t-2 positive rainfall shock is followed by a t-1 negative rainfall 
shock? The effect of this particular sequence of rainfall shocks on conflict risk is given by the 
coefficient on t-2 rainfall minus the coefficient on t-1 rainfall in Table 3, column (2). Hence, 
this particular sequence of shocks will be associated with significantly greater conflict risk if 
the coefficient on t-2 rainfall is significantly greater than the coefficient on t-1 rainfall. A test 
of this hypothesis using the estimates in Table 3 indicates that it cannot be rejected at the 98% 
confidence  level.  Hence,  the  rainfall  level  results  in  column  (2)  indicate  that  the  rainfall 
growth results in column (1) can be interpreted as the effect on conflict risk of a t-2 positive 
rainfall shock followed by a t-1 negative rainfall shock. More generally, Ciccone (2011) shows 
that  the  coefficients  of  the  rainfall  growth  specification  reflect  the  effects  of  particular 
sequences of shocks. Which sequence exactly depends on the rainfall growth lags included in 
the specification. 
  It is also interesting to note that due to mean reverting rainfall levels, rainfall growth rates 
in adjacent years are negatively correlated. Hence, the results of rainfall growth specifications 
may depend on which rainfall growth lags are included. Table 4, columns (1)-(4) illustrate this   6 
for civil conflict onset in MSS’s data. As can be seen in column (2), when only t-1 rainfall 
growth is included in the specification, the effect of rainfall growth drops by about 25% in 
absolute  value  compared  to  column  (1)  and—although  more  precisely  estimated  than  in 
column (1)—becomes statistically insignificant using the standard error preferred by Miguel 
and Satyanath (2011, 2011). Moreover, when t-2 rainfall growth is included in columns (3) 
and  (4),  the  effect  of  rainfall  growth  at  t-1  again  drops  in  absolute  value  and  becomes 
statistically  insignificant.  On  the  other  hand,  Table  4,  columns  (5)-(8)  show  that  the 
statistically significant positive effect of t-2 rainfall levels on conflict onset is robust to the lag 
structure. This is because the correlation between rainfall levels in adjacent years is weak. 
 
2. Income Shocks and Civil Conflict  
To determine the effect of income shocks on civil conflict, MSS estimate 
(3)    , 0 , 1 , 1 , c t c c c t c t c t Conflict t b IncomeGr b IncomeGr u a g - = + + + + , 
where  , c t IncomeGr  is the growth rate of income per capita between year t and t-1. MSS take 
this income growth rate to be a proxy of income shocks. As income growth is endogenous, 
MSS use rainfall growth or rainfall levels as instruments (for more details on the rainfall level 
results, see Miguel and Satyanath, 2011). They find that civil conflict onset is significantly 
more likely following low income growth at t and that civil conflict incidence is significantly 
more likely following low income growth at t-1. MSS’s interpretation of this finding is that 
civil conflict is more likely following negative economic shocks or negative growth shocks. 
  If  rainfall  shocks  had  a  permanent  effect  on  income,  the  approach  of  MSS  would  be 
appropriate  as  low  year-on-year  income  growth  rates  would  be  a  valid  proxy  of  negative 
income shocks. However, rainfall-driven income shocks are transitory and MSS’s approach   7 
can therefore lead to misleading conclusions. The reason is the following. Clearly, income 
growth  may  be  low  because  current  income  is  reduced  by  a  negative  rainfall  shock.  But 
income growth may also be low because positive rainfall shocks led to higher incomes in past 
years and rainfall and income levels are now reverting to the mean. This is supported by 
Miguel and Satyanath’s (2011) empirical finding that income growth between t and t-1 is 
significantly lower the greater rainfall levels at t-2 (their Table 1, Panel B, column (2); see also 
the results reported in equation (6) below). Hence, low income growth rates reflect a mixture 
of negative current rainfall (income) shocks and positive past rainfall (income) shocks.  
  Because low income growth rates reflect a mixture of negative current rainfall shocks and 
positive past rainfall shocks, MSS’s instrumental variables approach to equation (3) cannot be 
used to examine whether civil conflict is driven by positive or negative income shocks.  I 
therefore describe an alternative  approach, illustrate it using  MSS’s data, and contrast the 
results  with  Miguel,  Satyanath,  and  Sergenti’s  (2004)  and  Miguel  and  Satyanath’s  (2010, 
2011) conclusions. 
2.A.  Do Rainfall Shocks have Transitory or Permanent Effects on Income? 
In principle, rainfall-driven income shocks could be transitory or permanent (even if rainfall 
shocks  themselves  are  transitory).  Generally  speaking,  income  dynamics  may  reflect  a 
stochastic or deterministic trend p  or transitory shocks t , 
 (4)   , , , ln c t c t c t y p t = + . 
Rainfall shocks could affect income through t  or through p  and therefore have transitory or 
permanent income effects. The effect of rainfall shocks on income is transitory  if rainfall 
shocks affect short-run but not long-run income. Following Dell, Jones, and Olken (2008), the   8 
short-run and long-run effect can be estimated by regressing income growth on current and 
lagged rainfall. Suppose this yields 
(5)   , , 1 ,
0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ln ln log
I
c t c t c i c t i
i
y y Rain a a - -
=
- = +∑ , 
where hats denote estimated values. Then a 1-percent year-t rainfall shock raises income after j 
periods by  0 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ... j a a a + + +  percentage points. Least-squares estimation of (5) using MSS’s 
data yields 
 (6)   , , 1 , , 1 , 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ln ln 0.06log 0.021log 0.041log
(3.4) ( 1.1) ( 2.5)
c t c t c c t c t c t y y Rain Rain Rain a - - - - = + - -
- -
 
where  ˆc a  denotes country c fixed effects, and the numbers in brackets are t-statistics.
1 Hence, 
a 1-percent rainfall shock at t leads to a statistically significant increase in income at t of 0.06 
percentage  points.  But  income  at  t+1  is  predicted  to  increase  by  only  0.039  (0.06-0.021) 
percentage points and income at t+2 by only -0.002 (0.06-0.021-0.041) percentage points. The 
hypothesis that rainfall shocks do not affect income after two periods cannot be rejected at any 
conventional confidence level. Hence, the effect of rainfall shocks on income is transitory and 
rainfall cannot serve as an instrument for permanent income shocks.
2  But as rainfall has a 
significant contemporaneous income effect, they can be used as an instrument for transitory 
income shocks (assuming that the relevant exclusion restriction can be taken to be satisfied). 
  For a different perspective on the results in (6), suppose that the transitory component of 
income in (4) depends on current and past rainfall levels,  , , 0 , 1 , 1 ln ln ln c t c t c t c t y R R p l l - = + + . In 
                                                 
1 Results are similar when, following MSS,  I also control for country-specific linear time 
trends. In this case the rainfall coefficients (t-statistics) are 0.058 (3.1); -0.019 (-0.9); and -
0.035 (-2.1). 
2 Dell, Jones, and Olken (2008) also find that the income effect of rainfall shocks is transitory 
(for Sub-Saharan African countries as well as a larger sample of countries).   9 
this  case,  year-on-year  income  growth  is  given  by 
, , 1 , , 1 0 , 0 1 , 1 1 , 2 ln ln ( ) ln ( )ln ln c t c t c t c t c t c t c t y y R R R p p l l l l - - - - - = - + - - - .  Hence,  if  current 
rainfall levels have a stronger (positive) effect on income than past rainfall levels,  0 1 l l > , 
year-on-year growth should depend positively on current rainfall levels and negatively on past 
rainfall levels. This is consistent with the results in (6) and Miguel and Satyanath’s (2011) 
Table 1, Panel B, column (2). 
2.B.  Rainfall, Transitory Income Shocks, and Civil Conflict 
Estimating the effect of rainfall-driven income shocks on civil conflict requires a model of 
income  dynamics in  (4).  A  standard  approach  is  to model  income  dynamics  as  stationary 
fluctuations around a country-specific linear time trend. This model can be tested against the 
alternative of non-stationarity for at least one country using the Hadri (2000) panel test, which 
yields that stationarity around a country-specific linear time trend cannot be rejected at any 
conventional confidence level. Using this approach to income dynamics yields strong effects 
of  rainfall  on  income  fluctuations.  Regressing  log  income  on  country-specific  linear  time 
trends and contemporaneous log rainfall  yields a coefficient on rainfall of 0.086 with a t-
statistic of 4.48. 
  Table 5 uses MSS’s data to estimate the effect of rainfall-driven income shocks on civil 
conflict when income dynamics are characterized by stationary fluctuations around a country-
specific linear time trend. The main regressors of interest are log income per capita levels at t, 
t-1, and t-2 instrumented by log rainfall levels. As the specifications also include country-
specific linear time trends, the coefficient on log income levels can be interpreted as the effect 
of rainfall-driven income shocks. The results in column (1) indicate a significantly positive 
effect of t-2 income shocks on conflict. This effect becomes stronger when I drop lagged   10 
conflict incidence in column (2). Column (3) consider conflict onset as the dependent variable 
and finds no evidence of a statistically significant link between income shocks and conflict 
onset.
3 Hence, there is no evidence that negative income shocks increase the probability of 
civil  conflict.  If  anything,  the  evidence  goes in  the  opposite direction  as negative  income 
shocks lower the likelihood of civil conflict incidence. 
  An  alternative  way  of  estimating  the  effect  of  rainfall-driven  income  shocks  on  civil 
conflict is to follow modern macroeconomic practice and use the Hodrick-Prescott filter to 
decompose income dynamics into a trend and a cycle and then examine whether civil conflict 
is linked to the rainfall-driven cyclical income component. This approach requires two steps. 
The first step implements the Hodrick-Prescott filter separately for each Sub-Saharan African 
country following Ravn and Uhlig (2002). The second step uses the cyclical component as a 
measure of income shocks and runs an instrumental variables regression of civil conflict on 
the current and lagged cyclical income components instrumented by log rainfall levels. Even 
though the regressors of interest are generated, this approach yields consistent point estimates 
and standard errors that are valid for testing the null hypothesis of no effect (see Wooldridge, 
2002, Section 6.1.2). The empirical results using MSS’s data are in Table 6. The first column 
shows that the cyclical income component, denoted by GDP HP, is strongly positively related 
to rainfall. Columns (2)-(4) use log rainfall levels as an instrument to estimate the effects of 
cyclical  income  fluctuations  on  civil  conflict  incidence  and  onset.  The  results  show  that 
conflict is less likely following negative t-2 income shocks. 
 
                                                 
3 Recall that for civil conflict onset, MSS find a significantly negative effect of income growth at t. The 
results in Table 5, column (3) indicate a negative effect of income shocks at t and a positive effect of 
income shocks at t-1. Hence, it is natural to wonder whether MSS’s results reflect the effect of a 
positive income shock at t-1 followed by a negative income shock at t. A formal test rejects that civil 
conflict onset is more likely following this particular sequence of shocks at the 90% confidence level.   11 
3. Conclusions 
The  discrepancies  between  Miguel  and  Satyanath’s  (2011)  and  Ciccone’s  (2011)  findings 
regarding the effect of rainfall shocks on civil conflict in the data of Miguel, Satyanath, and 
Sergenti (2004) arise for two reasons. First, Miguel and Satyanath do not examine the effect of 
rainfall  on  civil  conflict  onset  (outbreak).  Civil conflict  onset  is less  likely  following low 
rainfall levels and negative rainfall shocks. Second, when Miguel and Satyanath examine the 
effect of rainfall on civil conflict incidence—which pools conflict onset and continuation—
they do not account for civil conflict being more likely when there was a civil conflict in the 
previous year. Once the persistence of civil conflict is accounted for, civil conflict incidence is 
less likely following low rainfall levels and negative rainfall shocks. 
  Estimating the effect of rainfall-driven (transitory) economic shocks on civil conflict is 
trickier  than  currently  understood  in  the  literature.  For  example,  Miguel,  Satyanath,  and 
Sergenti’s (2004) instrumental variables approach cannot be used to examine whether civil 
conflict  is  more  likely  following  positive  or  negative  rainfall-driven  economic  shocks.  I 
therefore  propose  an  alternative  approach  and  implement  it  using  the  data  of  Miguel, 
Satyanath, and Sergenti. My results indicate that civil conflict onset was not driven by income 
shocks.  Civil  conflict  incidence  was  less  likely  following  negative  income  shocks.  This 
conclusion stands in contrast with that of Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti and Miguel and 
Satyanath  (2010,  2011),  who  argue  that  civil  conflict  was  more  likely  following  negative 
income shocks.  12 
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Table 1. Rainfall and civil conflict onset 
 
  MSS (2004) data 
__________________________ 
  (1)  (2) 








Log Rainfall, t    -0.073 
(0.078) 
[0.086] 
Log Rainfall, t-1    -0.026 
(0.069) 
[0.075] 
Log Rainfall, t-2    0.156** 
(0.068) 
[0.074] 
Country FE and 
Trend 
Yes  Yes 
Observations  555  555 
 
Note:  The  left-hand-side  variable  is  an  indicator  variable  capturing  civil  conflict  onset.  The  method  of 
estimation  is  least  squares.  Standard  errors  in  parentheses  are  robust  for  arbitrary  heteroskedasticity  and 
clustered  at  the  country  level.  Standard  errors  in  square  brackets  also  apply  the  STATA  small-sample 
adjustment preferred by Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011). The statistical theory behind hypothesis tests 
using the small-sample-adjusted standard errors assumes normally distributed and homoskedastic residuals 
(e.g.  Greene,  1990,  page  161).  Both  the  normality  assumption  and  the  homoskedasticity  assumption  are 
violated in linear probability models, where the left-hand-side variable is either 0 or 1 as in the case of civil 
conflict onset and incidence (e.g. Wooldridge, 2002, page 454). I report standard errors incorporating the 
small-sample adjustment to  facilitate  comparison  with  Miguel  and  Satyanath  (2010,  2011).  *Significantly 
different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. When the 
asterisks are next to the least-squares point estimate, the confidence level applies no matter which of the two 
standard errors is employed. When the asterisks are next to the standard error, the confidence level applies to 
that standard error only. 
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Table 2. Rainfall and civil conflict incidence 
 
  MSS (2004) data 
_______________________________________________ 
    (1)  (2)   (3)  (4) 
     LS   GMM   LS  GMM 






   






   






























Country FE and Trend    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations    743  743  743  743 
 
Note: The left-hand-side variable is an indicator variable capturing civil conflict incidence. The method of estimation 
is  least  squares  or  system-GMM.  Standard  errors  in  parentheses  are  robust  for  arbitrary  heteroskedasticity  and 
clustered at the country level. Standard errors in square brackets also apply the STATA small-sample adjustment 
preferred  by Miguel  and Satyanath  (2010, 2011). The  statistical theory behind  hypothesis  tests using  the  small-
sample-adjusted standard errors assumes normally distributed and homoskedastic residuals (e.g. Greene, 1990, page 
161). Both the normality assumption and the homoskedasticity assumption are violated in linear probability models, 
where the left-hand-side variable is either 0 or 1 as in the case of civil conflict onset and incidence (e.g. Wooldridge, 
2002, page 454). I report standard errors incorporating the small-sample adjustment to facilitate comparison with 
Miguel  and  Satyanath  (2010,  2011).  *Significantly  different  from  zero  at  90  percent  confidence,  **  95  percent 
confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.  15 
 
Table 3. Rainfall and civil conflict incidence, Miguel and Satyanath (2011) 
 
  MSS (2004) data 
___________________________ 
    (1)     (2)   
     LS     LS   
Rainfall Growth, t    -0.024 
 [0.043] 
     
Rainfall Growth, t-1    -0.122** 
 [0.052] 
     
Log Rainfall, t        -0.0762 
 [0.065] 
 
Log Rainfall, t-1        -0.115 
 [0.076] 
 
Log Rainfall, t-2        0.110 
 [0.079] 
 
Country FE and Trend    Yes    Yes   
Observations    743    743   
 
Note: The left-hand-side variable is an indicator variable capturing civil conflict incidence. The method of 
estimation is least squares. Standard errors in square brackets are robust for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and 
clustered at the country level and also apply the STATA small-sample adjustment. *Significantly different from 
zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.    16 
Table 4. Rainfall and civil conflict onset 
 
 
  MSS (2004) data 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Rainfall Growth, t  -0.062 
(0.044) 
[0.048] 
    -0.061 
(0.052) 
[0.058] 
       












       
Rainfall Growth, t-2      0.087 





       
Log Rainfall, t-1          -0.029 
(0.072) 
[0.079] 
    -0.002 
(0.069) 
[0.076] 


















Country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Trend  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  555  555  521  521  555  555  521  521 
 
Note: The left-hand-side variable is an indicator variable capturing civil conflict onset. The method of estimation is 
least squares. The method of estimation is least squares or system-GMM. Standard errors in parentheses are robust for 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and clustered at the country level. Standard errors in square brackets also apply the STATA 
small-sample adjustment preferred by Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011). The statistical theory behind hypothesis 
tests using the small-sample-adjusted standard errors assumes normally distributed and homoskedastic residuals (e.g. 
Greene, 1990, page 161). Both the normality assumption and the homoskedasticity assumption are violated in linear 
probability models, where the left-hand-side variable is either 0 or 1 as in the case of civil conflict onset and incidence 
(e.g. Wooldridge, 2002, page 454). I report standard errors incorporating the small-sample adjustment to facilitate 
comparison with Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011).  When the asterisks are next to the least-squares point estimate, 
the confidence level applies no matter which of the two standard errors is employed. When the asterisks are next to the 
standard error, the confidence level applies to that standard error only. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent 
confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.   17 
Table 5. GDP Growth, GDP, and Civil Conflict 
 
MSS (2004) data 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
           _____Civil Conflict Incidence              Civil Conflict Onset 
 
    (1)  (2)    (3) 




  -1.276 
(1.270) 




  1.598 
(1.530) 




  1.703 
(1.242) 
Lagged Incidence    0.213** 
(0.105) 
     
Country FE    Yes  Yes    Yes 
Country Trend    Yes  Yes    Yes 
Observations    702  743    555 
 
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. Standard errors in parentheses are robust for 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and clustered at the country level. *Significantly different from zero at 90 
percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.  
 
 
   18 
Table 6. Economic Fluctuations and Civil Conflict 
 
MSS (2004) data 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                 GDP HP                _Civil Conflict Incidence_            Civil Conflict Onset 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Log Rainfall, t  0.033*** 
(0.011) 
     




     


















Lagged Incidence    0.218** 
(0.096) 
   
Country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Trend  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  743  702  743  555 
 
Note: The method of estimation in column (1) is least squares; in columns (2)-(4) two-stage least squares. 
Standard errors in parentheses are robust for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and clustered at the country level.  
*Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent 
confidence.  
 
 
 